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Competitiveness Bargaining in France: A study of multiple union action in the 
automotive industry 
1. Introduction 
The trajectory of bargaining decentralisation from industry to company-level to boost 
economic competitiveness has deep roots in France. Alongside a raft of regulatory reform, 
the 2008 economic crisis deepened this process further, signalled by the signing of several 
competitiveness agreements (accords de compétitivité) in its wake (Freyssinet, 2013; 
Ancelovici, 2014; Amable, 2016)1. The ratification of company and plant-specific 
competitiveness agreements in crisis-ridden employers raises questions around how 
increasingly market-exposed labour relations effect and potentially erode workplace 
institutions characterised by distinct and long-standing cultural traditions (Hauptmeier, 2012). 
Such concerns are salient given France’s multi-unionism, characterised by several unions of 
varying organisational cultures. Might convergence occur across traditionally different unions 
in responding to workplace competitiveness bargaining, encouraging them to put aside 
longstanding rivalries? Thus, under the threat of job loss and plant closure, do unions 
converge in response? What is the caliber of such responses and their impact for inter-union 
relations? 
 
The picture at local-level is complicated further by a 2008 reform on Social Democracy and 
Working Time. Abolishing the ‘presumption of representativeness’ guaranteeing five trade 
union confederations access to workplaces since 1966, the 2008 law changed the rules, 
making local works council (comité d’entreprise) election results the measure of bargaining 
rights. Even if traditionally divergent unions converge in response to competitiveness, 
electoral rivalries may still encourage differentiation, inhibiting collaboration This paper 
 
1	 See	 also	 media	 reports	 e.g.	 from	 national	 state	 media,	 France	
[https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/industrie/entreprises-les-accords-de-competitivite-signes-en-
france_2760517.html];	 Le	Monde	 (2012)	 ‘Accords	 compétitivité-emploi"	 :	 les	 louvoiements	 de	 la	 majorité’,	
Available:	 https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/09/11/accords-competitivite-emploi-les-
louvoiements-de-la-majorite_1758393_823448.html		
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explores these matters by studying different local unions’ responses to competitiveness 
bargaining under the new representativeness rules and examining the implications for inter-
union relations. 
 
In drawing upon evidence, the article presents case studies of two headline competitiveness 
agreements from the automotive industry ratified after the 2008 crisis - at Renault and 
Groupe Peugeot Société Anonyme (PSA). These competitiveness agreements concluded in 
2013, were hailed as among “the first of their kind” in France given their comprehensive and 
long-term encompassment of pay, working time and a plethora of shop-floor matters in 
exchange for investment (Eurofound, 2013; Broughton et al. 2013). The agreements, signed 
under pronounced crisis, received significant attention2 and were followed by others, 
predominately in the automotive supply chain, notably at Bosch and Michelin (but also other 
manufacturing sectors, like pharmaceuticals). The automotive sector was at the centre of 
adjustment pacts since the 2008 recession because, after banking and construction, the 
industry was severely affected and remains highly exposed to international competition and 
capital outflows (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010). It presents an ideal site for 
investigating concerns around multiple union responses and inter-union relations.  
 
The article presents as follows: Section Two reviews issues raised by the negotiation of 
competitiveness agreements under conditions of French multi-unionism, considering the 
impact of the representativeness reforms. Section Three outlines the case studies’ 
methodology and Section Four details the findings. Section Six concludes with discussion. 
 
2. Negotiating competitiveness agreements under revised representativeness rules 
 
2	 Le	 Monde	 (2013)	 ‘Renault:	 les	 principaux	 points	 de	 l'accord	 de	 compétitivité’,	 Available	 online	
[https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/03/07/renault-les-principaux-points-de-l-
accord_1844175_3234.html];	Libération	(2013)	‘Accord	social	chez	PSA:	vraiment	gagnant-gagnant?’,	Available	
online	 [http://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2013/10/22/accord-social-chez-psa-vraiment-gagnant-
gagnant_941478]	
	
3 
 
The evolution of bargaining and representativeness in the French context 
Legacies of union victimisation by employers and internal fragmentation in the labour 
movement historically made collective bargaining problematic in France (Guillaume et al, 
2018; Howell, 2009). Indeed, unions were only formally recognised as holding a workplace 
presence in 1968 with the provision of délégués syndicaux (union delegates) who hold 
power to negotiate agreements. The state had begun to establish company-specific 
representative structures to promote peaceful interaction between management and workers 
in 1936, leaving conflict between unions and employers outside the firm (Laulom, 2012). 
This process began with délégués du personnel (employee delegates, DPs), whose function 
was grievance-handling, followed in 1945 by the introduction of works councils, holding 
information and consultation rights. Positions in both structures are typically occupied by 
union activists, although there is variation across industries, and non-union DPs can be 
prominent in small and medium enterprises, although rare in large companies (DARES, 
2018). In 1966, the state attempted to enhance union legitimacy by awarding ‘irrefragable 
representative’ status to five confederations: the CFDT (Confédération française 
démocratique du travail), the CFE-CGC (Confédération française de l'encadrement-
Confédération générale des cadres), the CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs 
chrétiens), the CGT (Confédération générale du travail), and FO (Force ouvrière). 
Representativeness was determined by, inter alia, unions’ membership numbers and length 
of existence (Béroud et al, 2012), empowering those meeting the criteria to sign collective 
agreements. Given that sector-level bargaining dominated when the status was awarded, 
smaller ‘representative’ unions could sign agreements for entire industries, resulting in fragile 
agreements with little legitimacy (Labbé, 2001).  
 
Over time, successive policy initiatives devolved collective bargaining to company-level. The 
1982 Auroux Laws obliged employers to bargain annually on issues like pay (Chambost et 
al, 2009) and heralded a shift to decentralised bargaining. It received a mixed response from 
the country’s unions. Some, such as the CGT and CFE-CGC, viewed firm-level bargaining 
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as a threat to their legitimacy (Barthélemy and Groux, 2012; Béthoux et al, 2013). Other 
unions, such as the CFDT, used bargaining decentralisation as an opportunity to refocus its 
strategy towards a “syndicalisme d’adhérents” (member-based unionism) (Guillaume and 
Pochic, 2009; Guillaume, 2014). With an emphasis on recruitment and members’ 
participation in union action, this approach was deemed necessary by CFDT leadership to 
strengthen its local bargaining power vis-à-vis employers (ibid.).  
 
Recent decades witnessed further reforms favouring company bargaining, again receiving a 
similar range of union responses. In 2004, the Fillon Law enabled company agreements to 
derogate from industry agreements in most areas of employment terms and conditions 
(Dirringer, 2016). To better align pre-existing representative structure with company 
bargaining, the 2008 reform on Social Democracy and Working Time sought to bring unions 
closer to the workforce by modifying the representative status granted in 1966 (Boulin, 2008; 
Rojot, 2014). Local works council election scores became the measure of 
representativeness rather than affiliation to nationally representative confederations 
(Farvaque, 2016). Although works council elections are not new to France’s system of 
representation, this constituted the first time they were used to determine bargaining rights 
(Yon, 2012). Trade unions monopolise the first round of elections, with a second round only 
occurring if union candidates fail to obtain half the available votes. The 2008 law prescribed 
that unions need 10% of votes before they can participate in negotiating agreements, and 
collective agreements must be validated by one or several unions holding at least 30% 
representativeness. Initially, unions holding 50% or more were given powers to obstruct 
agreements struck between other unions and employers. However, the El-Khomri Law in 
2016 raised ratification thresholds to 50%, and removed the right to obstruct3. 
 
 
3	This	trajectory	was	further	reinforced	by	the	Ordonnances	Macron	(Macron	Orders),	which	entered	into	force	
in	 early	 2018.	 These	 Orders	 were	 aimed	 at	 “reinforcing	 social	 dialogue”	 in	 firms	 and	 served	 to,	 inter	 alia,	
expand	once	more	the	range	of	issues	covered	by	firm-level	bargaining,	and	merge	the	various	institutions	of	
workplace	representation	into	a	single	body-	the	Comité	social	et	économique	(CSE).	
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Larger unions such as the CFDT and CGT were welcoming of the 2008 representative 
reform, perceiving it as a way to ‘crowd out’ smaller rivals by their greater capacity to divert 
resources to electoral campaigns (Andolfatto and Labbé, 2008). Squeezed by threshold 
requirements, smaller unions would be forced to consolidate with other unions through 
merger (Yon and Béroud, 2013). Alternatively, the reform could allow smaller unions, 
particularly the so-called ‘autonomous unions’ unaffiliated with the traditional representative 
status, to expand influence at workplace level and amass bargaining power (Farvaque, 
2016; Béroud et al, 2013). Arguably this could prove a threat to unions previously 
guaranteed institutional security by encouraging more competitors into the electoral fray, 
fragmenting the vote and potentially weakening larger unions. 
 
Competitiveness Bargaining in a period of crisis 
These bargaining and representative reforms represent a continuing attempt by the state 
and employers to enhance labour flexibility amid persistent problems of national 
competitiveness (INSEE, 2014). A reflection of France’s lack of competitiveness is 
employers threatening délocalisation (relocation), a controversial development resulting in 
high-profile political pressure for indigenous companies to remain at home (Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak, 2005). In exchange for doing so, French employers call repeatedly for greater 
cost (labour) competitiveness (Beaujolin-Bellet and Schmidt, 2012) fostering a favourable 
environment for a new round of competitiveness agreements since the 2007-08 crisis 
(Broughton et al, 2013)4. Indeed, the best-known experimentation on competitiveness 
agreements in France was on working time in the 1990s and early 2000s, driven by a need 
to comply with the government-regulated reduced working week instigated by the Aubry and 
Robien laws (Gilles, 2006). Legislatively mandated working time reductions were introduced 
via negotiations in ways that did not harm company competitiveness (Freyssinet and Seifert, 
2001). These agreements traded reduced working weeks for the creation or preservation of 
 
4	For	a	European-wide	perspective	see	Glassner	et	al.	(2011)	
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jobs, while also allowing adjustments for scheduling flexibility during less busy periods 
(Sisson and Artiles, 2000; Richevaux, 2001).  
 
However, these working time competitiveness agreements were not driven by the financial 
circumstances of individual employers in crisis. In contrast, the post-crisis agreements 
emerging in the last decade were induced under conditions of economic recession, where 
the risks of job loss and plant closure were real and immediate. These types of 
competitiveness agreements have occurred among crisis-ridden manufacturers since 2008. 
While incorporating similar measures to those agreed in the 1990s/2000s by linking working 
time flexibility with employment, these more recent competitiveness agreements cover a 
greater range of issues, such as pay, shop-floor organisation and training in exchange for 
guarantees of investment and employment preservation. Then-President Sarkozy actively 
championed competitiveness agreements in this period, arguing that they allow employers 
and employees to “talk freely” about employment, pay and flexibility5.  
 
Further bargaining reforms reinforced this trajectory. In 2013, the Employment Securitisation 
Law allowed employers in “severe economic stress” to negotiate temporary competitiveness 
agreements permitting changes in working hours and wage reductions in exchange for job 
guarantees (Sauviat and Serfati, 2013:34). Nationally, the CGT and FO criticised 
competitiveness agreements as wage reduction measures, refusing to support the 
Employment Securitisation Law, which instigated their negotiation in firms throughout the 
country. In contrast, the CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC national confederations supported the 
law, having signed the national ‘interprofessional’ agreement which formed the basis of the 
legal text (Freyssinet, 2013). More recently, the El-Khomri Law provided legal priority to 
company-level agreements on working time, overtime pay, leave and rest, even if terms are 
less favourable to employees than those agreed sectorally.  Again, union reactions to these 
 
5	Le	Monde	(2012)	Les	«	accords	compétitivité-emploi	»	ou	la	fin	du	droit	du	travail,	Available	
[https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/03/26/les-accords-competitivite-emploi-ou-la-fin-du-droit-du-
travail_1674925_3232.html]	
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laws ranged from the CGT and FO’s outright rejection to more nuanced approaches from the 
CFDT, CFE-CGC and the CFTC focusing on balancing flexibility and security (Andolfatto 
and Labbé, 2016). 
 
Implications for unions: union responses and inter-union relations 
How are union responses to competitiveness bargaining developing under the new 
representativeness rules? There are several strands to such an exploration which warrant 
unpacking. First, how might unions respond to the pressures of competitiveness bargaining? 
One view from the literature on decentralised bargaining suggests that company and plant 
unions might move towards ‘micro-corporatism’ (Daley, 1999; Howell, 2009). Isolated at 
enterprise-level and exposed to job loss and factory closure, local unions become 
incentivised to cooperate with employers in ratifying competitiveness agreements. French 
unions’ workplace presence is frequently weak, characterised by a paucity of members and 
activists, or ‘virtual unionism’ (Howell, 2009), which is ascribed to legacies of sectoral 
bargaining (see also, Tallard and Vincent, 2014). Fragile workplace unions are liable to 
acquiesce to the employer’s competitiveness agenda, particularly if whipsawed with cheaper 
locales elsewhere. ‘Negotiations’ become little more than a façade for managerial 
unilateralism (See Pernot, 2018: 44, 49, 55-57). 
 
An alternative view suggests local unions may respond to competitiveness bargaining 
differently. Rather than succumbing to a cooperative bias, local unions can overcome 
weaknesses by leveraging state intervention to protect employment and working conditions, 
particularly in high-profile employers (Parsons, 2013a,b). French unionists may exploit a 
political climate sensitive to fears of globalization and an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ style race to the 
bottom via mobilisation (Parsons, 2013a). As Pernot (2018: 57) notes, French unions at the 
very least retain their “discursive ability” to challenge employers with some remarkable 
evidence of radical opposition found in employers unlawfully confined and workers 
threatening to ‘blow up the factory’ (Pernot, 2018: 54).  Less accommodative responses to 
8 
 
competitiveness bargaining would also be in keeping with a large part of the national (if 
somewhat stylized) industrial relations culture which associates bargaining with protest and 
mobilisation (Béroud and Mouriaux, 2001; Clift, 2012).  
 
Aside from this literature saying nothing about how different unions may be inclined to one 
approach over others, it also rarely considers how the new representative rules can 
potentially complicate union responses (Béthoux and Jobert, 2012). The wishes of the local 
electorate may sway unions and - if recent polling is to be believed- employees may not 
approve of union actions perceived as ‘too ideological’ or ‘too political’ (TNS-Sofres, 2015). 
This might weaken union branches’ willingness to call for adversarial mobilisations for fear of 
being perceived as distant from employees’ needs. Nonetheless, unions’ utility may be 
questioned if they fail to adequately balance between concession and capitulation and 
descend into a micro-corporatist position. Too cooperative may risk being outmanoeuvred by 
more militant unions, capitalising on employee discontent. 
 
The pluralistic structure of workplace representation in France also means that elected 
representatives must work with other unions, raising a second matter of inter-union relations. 
Inter-union rivalry is well-known, driven by different organisational cultures and exacerbated 
by competition for votes in works council elections (Amable, 2016). Organisational culture is 
understood here to refer to both the main cultural values associated with individual unions, 
but also their preferred repertoires of organising union action both in terms of internal union 
structure and preferred relations to employers (see also McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 91). 
As Swidler (1986 :273) notes, culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values 
towards which action is orientated, but by shaping a repertoire or tool kit of styles which 
actors construct strategies of action. In the main, French confederal union structure 
organises at national, sectoral (with various associating federal branches), company and 
plant levels. France’s bargaining structure meant that national and sectoral levels 
traditionally dominated within each confederation, although the rise of local-level bargaining 
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has raised the prominence of local-level delegates. There are, formally, significant 
differences across the unions. The CFE-CGC, a highly centralized union, views itself as non-
political, favourable to the ‘middle classes’ and a defender of ‘merit’ against the alleged 
‘egalitarian’ postures of other unions (Béthoux et al, 2013). It is a ‘categorical’ union 
representing only second (non-manual, supervisory) and third (managerial) colleges of staff6. 
Although its orientation has shifted over the decades, the CFDT follows a “syndicalisme de 
proposition” (unionism of proposals), a ‘pragmatic’ vision emphasising results and 
compromise, reconciling the interests of the business with those of employees (Barthélemy 
and Groux, 2012; Rey, 2012; Ancelovi, 2014). CFDT members appear to hold a cohesive 
view of union practices, values and political stances, in part because many dissenters left to 
join the autonomous Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques (SUD) (Barthélemy, 2012; 
Guillaume, 2014).  
 
While cognisant of internal tensions in the confederation, the CGT is regarded as pursuing a 
“syndicalisme de conquête” (unionism of conquest) with the intent of mobilising against the 
power of ‘globalised capital’ (Piotet, 2009). However, it is noteworthy that recent 
observations indicate that, in the private sector, the CGT signs almost as many company-
level agreements as the other unions (DARES, 2017; Laroche and Salesina, 2018). The 
union has traditionally adopted a loose internal administration described as ‘organised 
anarchy’ (Thomas, 2013) and there are long-standing problems of cohesion and internal 
disunity (Bensoussan, 2009; Piotet, 2009). In contrast, Pernot (2010) argues that, while the 
CFTC’s leadership remains close to a traditional Catholicism, the rank-and-file are moving 
towards more secular views to the extent that differences with CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO are 
blurring; a rapprochement with one of the latter is plausible. The CFTC (2017) indicates that 
it local unions are sovereign as this allows closer relations with the rank-and-file members.  
 
6‘Colleges’	refer	to	the	electoral-representative	structure	based	on	proportional	representation.	There	are	
separate	electoral	colleges	for	the	three	categories	of	employees	(first:	manual,	second:	non-manual	and	
supervisory,	and	third:	managerial).	As	a	‘categorical’	union,	the	CFE-CGC	only	requires	10%	of	the	vote	in	the	
colleges	it	represents	(rather	than	10%	of	the	overall	vote	like	the	other	unions).	
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Finally, the FO’s leadership describes the confederation as following a “militant reformism” 
situated between ‘politicised reformism’ and ‘conflictual unionism’ (Andolfatto, 2007:41). 
Scholars express puzzlement at the apparent paradox of FO’s confederal approach of 
“contestation” and its grassroots’ seeming preference for “contractual unionism” (Barthélemy 
and Groux, 2012:102). Yon (2009) argues that this ‘contradiction’ between FO’s confederal 
discourse and local sections’ practice can be explained by the fact that not all activists are 
invested in the confederal sphere. Local-level needs may drive local activists rather than 
confederal policy, and, as such, grassroots sections can diverge significantly from the 
confederal stance (ibid.). 
  
This last point is salient. While varying organisational cultures across unions have served to 
embed inter-union distinctions and encourage rivalry, these could be weakened under 
greater exposure to competitiveness problems at company-level, rendering differences 
immaterial as local unions look to pragmatically preserve jobs and investment. A company 
competitiveness crisis marked by threatened job loss could be conceived as a shared 
problem requiring a joint union response, encouraging cooperation in negotiating an 
agreement (cf. Walsh, 1994). Proportional representation at the bargaining table may also 
dampen rivalry, particularly where the 30% bargaining threshold is individually unattainable 
and single unions are unable to accomplish negotiation objectives alone. Under threatened 
job loss, plant closure, and investment flight, local trade union representatives may become 
pragmatic in their dealings with other unions’ representatives, potentially encouraging new 
patterns of workplace alliance. Yet, if the structure of representation might encourage inter-
union cooperation, it may also hinder it.  Rivalry may prove too powerful for the protagonists 
to overcome under the pressure of electoral competition and institutional security. Aside from 
the fact that there may be a lack of agreement over preferred action vis-à-vis 
competitiveness bargaining, unions may fail to cooperate because of disparities in the need 
to do so, particularly in cases where one union commands majoritarian representativeness 
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and can act without recourse to others.  Thus, the picture for inter-relations appears 
uncertain and complex. 
 
In light of the above, the following sections will explore these matters by asking how different 
local union responses to competitiveness bargaining are developing under the new 
representativeness structure and how inter-union relations develop given the combined 
pressures of competitiveness and representativeness. 
 
4. Method and Case Studies Context 
The ‘how’ nature of the questions lend itself to case study analysis (Yin, 2013:11). Two case 
studies are deployed from the French automotive sector, Renault and PSA, where 
competitiveness agreements were first signed in March and October 2013 respectively 
under the threat of investment loss and factory closure at Renault Batilly and Cléon and PSA 
Rennes and Sevelnord. Signatures of the two firms’ competitiveness agreements occurred 
almost immediately before the second cycle of local works council elections under the 2008 
representativeness reform. The Renault agreement, inter alia, provided for a 2013 wage 
freeze, followed by wage moderation for 2014 and 2015. Increases in working time from 32 
to an average of 35 hours per week were secured, and compulsory Saturday working at 
management’s discretion without overtime pay was agreed. The PSA agreement, inter alia 
provided for wage moderation (including pay freezes in 2013 and 2014), stricter limits on 
reduced working days, greater manufacturing flexibility in terms of production workload 
redistribution of annual leave and obligatory overtime during busy periods.  
Both firms are seen as ‘national champions’, dominate the French automotive industry and 
account for over half the sector’s employment (CCFA, 2018). Yet this industry has been in 
difficulty for the past two decades. Consumer demand has re-orientated to low-mid range 
automotive segments, requiring cheaper builds. This has proved problematic in French 
plants, given the relatively high cost base. To preserve margins, both PSA and Renault 
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offshored to low-cost assembly plants in Eastern Europe and Turkey. French plants have 
been lumbered with the less commercially successful high-mid and premium models. The 
2008 crisis exacerbated the industry’s problems, resulting in the near-closure of Renault’s 
Sandouville plant, saved only by government intervention in 2008, and the outright closure of 
PSA Aulnay, employing 4,000, in 2013.  A combination of crisis and relocation induced 
falling employment numbers nationally: whereas 321,000 people worked in the automotive 
sector in 2000, this fell to 220,000 in 2010 and is now 213,000 as of 2017. PSA and 
Renault’s workforces diminished by approximately 25 percent in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis. Not only is the case study useful in providing detail on the competitiveness 
agreements emerging amid crisis, job loss and potential plant closure, but that both 
agreements were signed just before the second round of elections after the 2008 reform 
offers insight into decentralised bargaining under the new rules. Furthermore, the two 
companies exemplify multi-unionism, allowing an examination of the research concerns. 
Seven unions are active across both firms (see Table 2). 
 
While both employers’ industrial relations histories are well-documented, some background 
comments are appropriate. PSA’s history is complex and fragmented due to its merger with 
Citroën and Chrysler-Europe subsidiaries. Each of the three had their own separate 
employment relations policy in terms of classification systems, wages, pensions, and 
benefits, resulting from practices, tradition, or union victories linked to the history of each 
individual company (Loubet, 2001). As a family business, Peugeot aimed to marginalise 
unions by a paternalistic approach, offering housing, transport and shops for food and other 
goods to its workers (Gallard, 2004). Chrysler-Europe’s subsidiaries Simca and Talbot, and 
to a certain extent Citroën, were governed by a strong internal ‘yellow’ union (Confédération 
française du travail, CFT, later forming part of Groupement des Syndicats Européens de 
l'Automobile, GSEA) which suppressed the CGT and attempted to quash industrial unrest 
(Loubet and Hatzfeld, 2002).  Hatzfeld (2016) describes the legal battle resulting from PSA’s 
history of victimising CGT and CFDT representatives, where management discriminated 
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against activists from both unions in terms of work duties, remuneration and career 
progression. Management also encouraged workers to join the other unions like FO, the 
CFTC and CFT (later GSEA)(Hatzfeld, 2016). Over recent years, representativeness 
patterns at PSA have evolved. Increased prominence of research and development and 
high-end engineering roles as low-skilled assembly work is automated and offshored results 
in the rise of the categorical CFE-CGC as most representative union. Reflecting these 
trends, the CGT votes have waned, although it remains an equal second alongside FO.  
 
Expropriated by the state and nationalised in 1945, Renault became a pattern-setter for 
labour relations in the country, with a history of company agreements often forming the basis 
for wider transposition across metalworking industry. As a state-owned company in the post-
war period, Renault boasted a tradition as an innovator in socially progressive agreements, 
such as the 1955 firm-level agreement which guaranteed employee purchasing power 
through automatic cost-of-living adjustments (Freyssenet, 1998). Yet the company has also 
experienced militant union action, with many of its plants experiencing bitter strikes 
throughout history. Prior to the 1980s, management were relatively submissive to the then-
dominant CGT, ‘buying’ peace through wage increases following bouts of strike action 
(Hancké, 1996). As Renault faced competitive crisis throughout the 1980s and 1990s and 
underwent privatisation (albeit with the state continuing to hold around 15%), new conflicts 
emerged. Successive CGT-led strikes against pay and production reforms failed, weakening 
its popularity among the workforce (Loubet, 2000). Attempting to capitalise on declining 
morale amongst the CGT’s support base, FO fortified its grassroots branches at Renault 
sites, pushing ‘membership services’ to attract new supporters (Hancké, 1996). Similarly, the 
CFDT grew its base in the company in the 1980s and 1990s (Durand, 1996). Yet the CGT’s 
support remained sizeable, encouraging other unions towards ad-hoc cooperation on 
representative bodies, orchestrating block votes to ensure seats remained outside the CGT’s 
control (Cornudet, 1991). As at PSA, internal restructuring has produced the most 
meaningful change in union composition: the rise of the CFE-CGC. 
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Evidence Sources 
Evidence for the cases is derived from fieldwork undertaken at company-level and at 12 
assembly and powertrain plants over several years, examining a total 60 local union 
branches across seven unions (see Table 1, for case study characteristics and Table 2 for 
an overview of union representativeness). 
 
TABLE 1 
TABLE 2 
 
Three sources were used in the fieldwork. First, documentation on negotiations provided by 
sector, company and plant union branches. Over 1,700 documents were collected, including 
union tracts (circulars) and workplace union publications. Documentation spanned the period 
2008-2015, providing background and aftermath to the agreements. Media sources were 
consulted to gather contextual information. Second, evidence is sourced from semi-
structured interviews with 46 sectoral, company and plant delegates from the unions studied; 
these were purposively targeted to ensure a sufficient number of actors with relevant 
institutional positions and knowledge were represented. Third, observation of union activities 
during and after the agreements included attendance at industrial strikes, public protests, 
national, regional and plant individual union meetings and post-works council inter-union 
meetings and exchanges. Triangulation across various sources and different unions on the 
same issues supported the generation of a reliable account. Evidence was analysed via 
‘open coding’ through cross-comparisons of ‘methods of agreement’ and ‘methods of 
difference’, whereby the former considered what was common across the fieldwork, whilst 
the latter focused on evidence lacking common features and outcomes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
 
5. The Case Studies 
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The case studies are presented sequentially, focusing within each company on unions’ 
responses to the competitiveness agreements and their associated inter-union relations. 
PSA 
Union Responses 
Plagued by overcapacity, several years of financial losses and the 2013 closure of Aulnay’s 
assembly plant, the 2008 crisis and aftermath severely affected PSA. In 2011, an executive 
document, the ‘Varin Plan7’, detailed intentions to close Aulnay and potentially Sevelnord 
and Rennes, relocating production to a “choice of low-cost countries (Turkey, Morocco, or 
Eastern Europe)” (excerpt from Varin Plan). Disclosure prompted national political crisis8, 
although the CFDT, CFE-CGC, CGT and FO’s calls for state intervention to save Aulnay, as 
it had done in Renault Sandouville in 2008, proved fruitless; an outcome in part reflecting the 
differences in historical state intervention between the two companies.Two divergent 
approaches then emerged across the unions. Cognisant of the trauma of Aulnay’s closure 
and the need for further competitiveness-enhancing measures, the first response pursued a 
damage-limitation strategy, exchanging concessions for appropriate quid pro quos on job 
guarantees and site viability. This approach was pursued by CFE-CGC, CFDT, CFTC, FO 
and GSEA PSA local unions, commanding approximately 75% representativeness in 
aggregate (a share holding constant over the course of the study and three electoral periods 
considered). The response of this group of unions to employer competitiveness demands is 
captured by a GSEA-PSA delegate: 
 
We have this problem of high labour costs, high contributions and restrictive 
legislation. So if employees’ demands put forward by trade unions become too high, 
an employer, who isn’t a philanthropist, could go to a place where labour costs are 
cheaper, contributions aren’t as high, regulation isn’t as restrictive, and trade unions 
are less demanding. 
GSEA-PSA Delegate Interview 
 
 
7	Named	after	PSA’s	CEO	Philippe	Varin	
8	See,	for	example,	Le	Figaro	(2012)	Le	gouvernement	sonné	par	le	plan	social	de	PSA,	Available	:	
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2012/07/12/01002-20120712ARTFIG00630-le-gouvernement-sonne-par-le-
plan-social-de-psa.php	
16 
 
The second response is exhibited by the CGT. The CGT retains around a quarter of the 
representativeness share at the start of the fieldwork which then dropped to under a fifth in 
the years after the competitiveness agreement. The CGT advanced an ‘alternative 
production strategy’ involving non-risk plants subsidising at-risk plants by volume sharing;, 
government intervention to stabilise sites and unwillingness to enter cost-cutting 
competitiveness negotiations regarded as unsustainable:   
 
For the CGT, there is no question of committing to a contract where employees in 
France would work under Spanish conditions, the Spanish under Slovakian 
conditions, the Slovaks under Turkish conditions, and the Turks under Chinese 
conditions. 
CGT-PSA Delegate Interview 
 
These divergent responses in union action continued when PSA instigated negotiations on a 
competitiveness agreement in 2013, proposing, inter alia, a pay freeze for 2014 and pay 
moderations in 2015 and 2016. The CGT called for repeat mobilisations in opposition to the 
proposals. Initial CGT strike calls drew reasonable support, with approximately 4,000 
workers across PSA joining the mobilisation. In contrast, the CFE-CGC, CFDT, CFTC and 
FO, GSEA rejected this strategy, preferring to negotiate job guarantees in exchange for 
concessions. Such guarantees were not forthcoming. PSA resisted offering a ‘no 
redundancy’ job guarantees, instead offering to maintain volumes at 1,000,000 vehicles per 
year for the agreement’s duration and provide a new model to each assembly plant. Plants 
producing fewer than 250,000 vehicles annually would lose one production line with 
necessary job losses. Considering the production volumes insufficient to maintain jobs, the 
CFDT withdrew from negotiations and joined the CGT in calling for two rounds of strike 
action across plants: such actions drew no more than the initial CGT-led strikes. In contrast, 
the CFTC, CGC-CFE, FO and GSEA ratified the proposals via internal consultation and 
member votes, maintaining an acceptable quid pro quo in enhanced early retirement terms 
and new volume guarantees. Signatory unionists nonetheless characterised their 
cooperation as being driven by “management blackmail” (FO-Sevelnord Delegate) because 
the offer was either ratification or further site closure: 
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If there were no signatures at all, management can make proposals but they 
won’t be able to apply the measures. But we can’t stop the CEO from saying 
‘if I don’t make the factories competitive like I want, I will go and produce my 
cars somewhere else”. 
 FO-PSA Delegate Interview 
 
 
While the CGT continued to call for strike action after the agreement’s ratification to 
demonstrate opposition, overall turnout was poor at just 500 workers; a development which 
led the CFDT to drop involvement in further mobilisations. Nonetheless, local plant branches 
of the CGT continued to mobilise during individual plant-level consultations on the 
agreement’s implementation. However, this action was concluded after limited turnout; for 
example, just 15 and 30 strikers turned out at Poissy and Mulhouse respectively. 
 
Company-level negotiations were sandwiched in between electoral cycles: a new round of 
elections was initiated across plants over several months in the aftermath of the agreement. 
Negotiating status became the central electoral campaign issue at plant-level, with signatory 
unions promoting their stance as one of “responsibility” and non-signatories championing the 
position that rival unions “betrayed” the workforce; however, the pattern of subsequent 
electoral results evidenced a reproduction of prior patterns. If campaigning on agreement 
stance was the principal way competitiveness concerns intruded upon the calculus of 
electoral considerations, a smaller number of cases evidenced individual unions avoiding 
agreement responsibilities for fear of electoral consequence. For example, when PSA 
management at the Sochaux plant attempted to divide annual leave across the year as the 
agreement required, CFTC and FO branches voted against the proposal despite ratifying it 
at company-level. This prevented a decision on annual leave being taken at the site before 
the elections. However, when the works council voted again on annual leave after the 
election, CFTC and FO delegates’ then ratified the new distribution of working time; action 
unsurprisingly attacked as opportunistic by CGT-Sochaux: 
Usually they make a big deal when agreements are signed, we believe that they 
didn’t do so this time because they even know themselves that this is an 
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unprecedented step backwards. It’s been silence because they are aware that this 
obligatory division of annual leave is unpopular. 
CGT-Sochaux Delegate Interview 
Inter-Union Relations 
Turning to inter-relations, the following patterns were observed. Prior to the agreement, the 
announcement of Aulnay’s closure generated a cross-union company-level platform between 
the CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA entitled ‘Come Together to Save PSA’. However, this 
was confined to a handful of joint statements criticising the CGT’s actions at Aulnay involving 
a prolonged and sometimes violent strike in opposition to closure. The CFDT remained 
independent of the platform, partly because of historically poor relations with other unions at 
PSA, and partly because of internal division over whether to support the CGT-Aulnay. In any 
case, the platform was not sustained beyond a few weeks, because, as one participant 
observed, “each union works for itself” (FO-PSA delegate interview). Nonetheless, the 
platform was partially revived, albeit informally, during competitiveness negotiations, with the 
CFE-CGC, CFTC, GSEA, FO, and to a lesser extent the CFDT, sharing information on 
respective negotiating positions. Although no joint statements were issued upon ratification, 
individual signatories publicly commended each other for these coordinated efforts on 
information share and joint review. For example: 
We were only able to sign this agreement because we worked, along with the CFE-
CGC, GSEA and FO, to improve management’s proposals to limit the effects of this 
‘new social contract’ as far as possible. This is the type of participatory and 
responsible trade unionism with which we align ourselves.’ 
CFTC-PSA tract 
 
This theme of responsible unions acting in alignment at company-level was not sustained 
however. Subsequent annual pay agreements found each union acting individually with no 
information share, joint review or coordination. However, at plant-level and as indicated 
above, signatory unions in Mulhouse, Sochaux and Rennes did utilise pre-existing electoral 
pacts to promote their ‘responsibility’ in signing the agreement in contrast to the 
‘grandstanding’ of non-signatories. For example: 
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Why vote for the Rennes Alliance for the CE?... Because we do not regret signing the 
agreement which saved the site… Because we are participative and realistic, and 
don’t try to make you believe in Father Christmas. 
CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO, GSEA-Rennes tract 
 
However, these positive espousals of inter-union alignment were functions of historic plant-
level electoral alliances, rather than necessarily shared views on the competitiveness 
agreement, and were designed to counter CGT influence where the latter held considerable 
representativeness. Indeed, positive inter-relations among signatories were entirely 
contradicted by patterns at other PSA sites where one signatory union dominated 
representativeness and could thus act autonomously. In these cases, inter-signatory 
relations were rivalrous and hostile. For example, signatories at Poissy regularly issued 
attacks on one another during elections; the CFE-CGC criticised FO for only signing 
agreements “when elections are over” (CFE-CGC-Poissy tract), while FO attacked the CFTC 
for “copying” their negotiating positions to poach FO voters (FO-Poissy tract).  
 
In terms of non-signatories, shared CFDT and CGT opposition to the agreement did not 
result in coordination post-ratification. Limited strike turnout encouraged CFDT delegates to 
end mobilization and any cooperation with the CGT on this matter. CFDT-PSA advised local 
branches to campaign in subsequent elections on a “Third Way” between the “unions [who] 
betrayed employees through this ridiculous agreement”, and the CGT “which is 
systematically against everything” (CFDT-PSA Delegate Interview). Despite shared non-
signatory status and an antipathy towards what they regard as the “house union” signatories 
in PSA, the CFDT and CGT attribute their inability to sustain coordinated joint action to 
differences in their orientations: 
The CGT is a confrontational union…they say ‘I saw that the boss was bad, 
you are all victims, we have to rebel, we have to strike every week’…They are 
always the same, so it’s not a constructive union. 
CFDT-PSA Delegate Interview 
 
Every time a decision is made, 99.8 per cent of the time, the CFDT follow the 
[FO, CFTC and CFE-CGC]. 
CGT-PSA Delegate Interview 
20 
 
 
While the CGT attempted to obstruct the agreement’s implementation via its activists on 
plant works councils, the CFDT withheld any support for this strategy. As a result, delegates 
from signatory unions could easily outmanoeuvre CGT oppositionary motions to agreement 
implementation at plant-level, effectively sidelining the militants’ obstructionist strategy. 
Renault 
Union Responses 
How did Renault unions respond to the competitiveness negotiations at company-level? The 
CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO at company-level, commanding 65% representativeness willingly 
entered talks, but countered that the agreement hinged on volume commitments to 
guarantee jobs. In contrast, the CGT, commanding a fifth of representativeness shares, 
participated in the first round of talks before withdrawing when Renault proposed forced 
redeployment, increased working time and 7,500 job losses through natural attrition and 
early retirement. The CGT’s initial strategy, alongside that of the CFDT, was to approach 
negotiations to discuss, inter alia, expanding research and development in France and the 
potential for ergonomic job redesign. Such issues drew little traction from Renault 
negotiators, and talks quickly became overwhelmed by discussions on terms and conditions. 
Consequently, the CGT argued the agreement was a “social regression not to be supported” 
(CGT-Renault Delegate Interview), withdrawing to pursue company-wide strikes to 
encourage government intervention to moderate Renault’s proposals. Other unions deemed 
mobilization “premature” (FO-Renault Delegate Interview). The CGT calls for strikes proved 
limited, despite the participation of the non-representative SUD at plant-level. Strikes 
commanded an average turnout of between 10 and 30 strikers per plants studied. 
 
For those unions committing to talks, negotiations’ stuttered over Renault’s proposals on 
forced redeployment and unwillingness to guarantee volumes. Making little headway in 
negotiations, Renault threatened to close two plants if no agreement was reached. 
Negotiations collapsed as the CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO refused to participate under 
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conditions of “intimidation” (CFDT-Renault Delegate interview) and “blackmail” (CFE-CGC 
Renault tract). As a FO-Renault Delegate explained:  
We were in the middle of PSA’s Aulnay closure, so we didn’t take Renault’s threat 
lightly. However, we drew two red lines. First, to refuse the obligatory nature of 
mobility, which could lead to employees being made redundant if they refused. Next, 
because sites are under-utilised, we demanded firm and written commitments on 
volumes, because just talking about the sustainability of the sites left Renault the 
possibility to delocalise jobs. 
FO-Renault Delegate Interview 
 
The CGT again called for strike action which was then supported by the CFDT and FO who 
viewed it as a means of signalling the proposal’s unacceptability to the employer, and 
calculating that government intervention was likely (hitherto, the state stood aloof from 
negotiations). The joint strike call mobilised 1,700 Renault workers in one-day action; 
although the CFE-CGC refused to participate, arguing that long-term site viability would be 
served by competitiveness improvements than “politician’s preferences” (CFE-CGC-Renault 
Delegate Interview). Union ambitions for the mobilisations had the desired effect, prompting 
state ministers to intervene to chastise Renault for using de facto compulsory redundancy to 
improve competitiveness. Renault conceded, dropping the policy of forced redeployment and 
committing to produce 710,000 vehicles per year until 2016.  
 
The CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO returned to the negotiations, ultimately voting to ratify the 
agreement soon after. In the case of FO however, ratification proved contentious. During 
negotiations, FO-Renault delegates worked closely with their regional and sectoral 
counterparts in FO-Métaux. This was reported by FO delegates as partly out of fear that their 
support for a competitiveness agreement at Renault would be criticised by other FO plant-
level branches thereby allowing central delegates to lay responsibility with the sectoral 
officers. However, some plant-level FO delegates perceived that FO-Métaux was too 
involved and as too compliant in conceding to Renault’s terms, while also arguing that FO-
Renault support for the agreement contradicted the union’s national policy (see p.5 above). 
However, FO-Métaux countered the deal was acceptable given it did not lower wages or 
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maintain compulsory mobility. Upon FO’s ratification of the agreement, the FO-Cléon publicly 
attacked the company-level signatories and FO-Métaux. Issuing what it styled an “apology”, 
FO-Cléon criticised the negotiators for “betraying” the workforce (FO-Cléon tract, 2013). FO-
Cléon disbanded on site, with its activists establishing a new Union nationale des syndicats 
autonomes (UNSA) branch. FO-Sandouville, voting against ratification, also issued a tract to 
employees arguing that it did not agree with the deal, but that it would “respect the choice of 
the central union” (FO-Sandouville tract 2013). At Renault Flins, a sizeable number of FO 
delegates left the union upon ratification to create a new UNSA branch. FO subsequently 
lost close to 20 percent in the next elections at Flins. FO-Batilly issued an anti-agreement 
tract, claiming the company-level FO did not listen to its criticisms during the negotiations. 
The branch subsequently disbanded at the site. In this regard intra-union discord over the 
union’s response to competitiveness negotiations reverberated onto the union’s institutional 
representativeness, although it has not subsequently altered FO policy at company-level. 
 
The CGT central delegates maintained that signatory unions had “given up on the strike 
movement and believe management threats too readily” (CGT-Renault tract); while claiming 
that CFDT and FO only participated in strike action as a form of posturing before the 
workforce:  
It’s the same story when you read their union propaganda and when we interact with 
their delegates during central negotiations. On the employee side, just to calm them 
down, we read that they will not sign ‘unless’... then we hear them say to senior 
management that they will most likely sign. 
CGT-Le Mans Delegate 
 
With agreement ratification at company-level weakening a strategy based on mobilisation, 
the CGT-Renault delegates encouraged local branches to obstruct transposition of the 
agreement at plant-level through their influence on works councils. The sectoral CGT 
federation (CGT-FTM, CGT-Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie) also initiated a 
legal appeal to the Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre on CGT-Renault’s behalf over 
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the implementation of the agreement. Both strategies proved unsuccessful however (see 
below). 
 
Inter-Union Relations 
Turning to inter-relations, the following patterns were observed. Prior to the agreement, the 
2008 automotive crisis engendered novel forms of company-level inter-union cooperation at 
Renault; albeit rarely enduring beyond a few weeks. Crisis-induced wage austerity resulted 
in the first all-union Renault Alliance forming in 2010 to present common pay demands. This 
collapsed within three months due to divisions on bargaining positions, particularly between 
the CGT and others. Did ensuing competitiveness negotiations counter this fragmentation? 
The CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO liaised informally, sharing their views on negotiation progress. 
Meanwhile, CGT-Renault remained isolated. Initially, it had attempted to cultivate closer 
relations with the CFDT during the early phase of negotiations: of the three other unions, the 
CGT delegates held relatively amicable relations with the CFDT during the short-lived 
Alliance. Indeed, in an internal memo to its local union branches at Renault, the CFDT-
Renault praised the CGT’s presentation in one of the early negotiation sessions, detailing a 
convergence of views on the need for ‘employee-orientated’ job design and quality rather 
than cost-focused production. However, the CGT’s unwillingness to countenance 
concessions or participate in negotiations made inter-union exchanges difficult and relations 
with the CFDT quickly deteriorated: during the negotiations, the CFDT would publicly state 
that it “forcefully condemned the CGT’s demagogic attitude” in resorting to mobilisations 
(CFDT-Renault tract, 2013); while FO indicated that “it is better to bet on the future than to 
condemn it with the CGT’s irresponsible attitude’ (FO-Renault Delegate interview) and the 
CFE-CGC argued “certain people still think that a negotiation cannot be done without 
blockading factories or protesting on the street” (CFE-CGC delegate interview). Despite 
shared signatory status however, relations between the CFE-CGC, CFDT and FO did not 
move beyond informal information share. Post-agreement, unions retained their autonomous 
positions in annual pay talks.  
24 
 
 
Plant-level inter-union relations during this period also reflected an immunity from greater 
coordination in response to competitiveness negotiations. What coordination did exist among 
signatory unions at plant-level was confined to prior electoral pacts between CFE-CGC and 
either the CFDT or FO to circumvent the CGT’s influence. These occurred at Sandouville, 
Douai and Le Mans with the explicit purpose “to be able to have the most CE positions 
compared to the CGT” (CFE-CGC-Sandouville delegate). Where both the CFDT and FO 
were present at sites, they tended to adversarial relations however. In the elections 
immediately following the agreement, both unions sought to attract votes away from each 
other by claiming the other made no meaningful contribution to competitiveness 
negotiations, for example: 
In contrast to FO, from the start the CFDT took full responsibility for the risk to 
employees by putting forward a bargaining agenda. All the same, we have to 
give FO credit for its main characteristic: being the champions of hypocrisy. 
CFDT-Flins tract 
 
In response, FO-Flins reproached the CFDT for “mak[ing] it out like it made all the progress 
on the proposed agreement by itself” (FO-Flins tract). In some circumstances, electoral 
rivalry also produced hostility with the CFE-CGC, when both the CFDT and FO attempted to 
attract votes from the second and third electoral colleges of workers (technicians and 
managers). As this is the electoral college upon which the CFE-CGC organises, hostility 
erupts over ‘poaching’ supporters. 
 
In terms of plant-level unions opposed to the competitiveness agreements, CGT and SUD-
Renault presented the relevant case. After the agreement’s ratification, plant-level CGT 
branches and SUD jointly pursued strike action to obstruct its transposition. One CGT 
delegate described this CGT-SUD liaison as promising: 
We talk, we manage to get along [with SUD]. In the future we’ll be able to work 
together. That’s the objective. At Cléon, like elsewhere, we’ve always been the CGT 
alone against everyone, but if we can have allies to change management’s decisions, 
of course we’ll do it. 
CGT-Cléon Delegate Interview 
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However, the results of such strike action were limited: worker numbers involved were 
generally small and largely confined to the CGT’s main strongholds at the time, with 100 
participating at Sandouville, and 80 participating at Cléon. Smaller numbers (between 10 
and 40) were involved at the other sites studied. The CGT and SUD also jointly pursued the 
aforementioned legal challenges, claiming the deal derogated from plant working time 
agreements signed in 1999, which could not be overridden unless formally repealed. This 
case was eventually dismissed by the courts and despite cooperating on the matter, 
competition for similarly-minded voters fostered mutual hostility between the CGT and SUD 
at election time. In the electoral round some 12 months’ post-agreement, both CGT and 
SUD accused one another of spreading false rumours of internal divisions to weaken 
electoral credibility. At Douai, the SUD issued a public tract attacking the CGT’s “one goal of 
diminishing SUD’s electorate” at the site (SUD-Douai tract). Thus, the two unions’ shared 
repertoires of action disintegrated when institutional security was at play.  
 
6. Discussion 
This paper set out to consider how union responses to competitiveness bargaining are 
developing under the new representativeness rules. The literature review observed that 
some scholarship points towards micro-corporatism in responding to competitiveness 
bargaining (p.7), while other accounts raise the possibility for a continued adversarialism, 
drawing on long-standing traditions of mobilisation with the potential to challenge employers' 
narratives (p. 7-8).  The review suggested that, aside from uncertainty over which narrative 
has most analytical purchase under conditions of union multiplicity, responses are likely 
complicated given the reformed representative rules. Responses to competitiveness 
bargaining also raised a question over the consequences for inter-union relations: exposed 
to employer competitiveness demands at local-level, might different unions overcome long-
standing rivalries to coordinate common responses? Again, the representativeness reform 
was assessed to potentially complicate this dynamic (p. 8-10). This discussion considers 
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these questions based on the findings to derive some general conclusions. The section 
finishes with some general comments about the capacity of French unions to cope with 
pressures of globalisation via the mechanism of company-level competitiveness bargaining. 
 
The majoritarian union response in both PSA and Renault points in the direction of micro-
corporatism.  Renault and PSA's high degree of capital mobility, evident via factory closure 
at home and investments abroad, offers them the ability to coercively compare plants, 
placing inevitable downward pressure on unit labour costs. Recognising their lack of 
structural power to hamper the auto firms' competitiveness agendas, unions are forced into 
compromises weighted towards the employers' position (see also Greer and Hauptmeier, 
2016). In part, a “bias to cooperation” (Howell, 1992: 261) is a form of low-trust coercion 
stemming from employer threats of investment loss – which unions recognise as blackmail - 
but it is also a function of what Pernot (2018: 49) describes as due to unions who express 
“views more in line with those of employers (or with some social-liberal trends”. The electoral 
rise of the CFE-CGC in the representative structure exemplifies this; a union whose outlook 
on the need for competitiveness closely aligns to the employers’ given its ‘categorical’ 
membership base of higher-grade employees and middle managers. However, the other 
general unions, CFDT and FO, are also inclined to reference the self-defeating nature of 
militancy and the need for 'responsibility' in competitiveness bargaining. It is this position of 
compromise and concession, rather than the syndicalisme de conquête still practised by the 
CGT in the car plants, which is generating most gains in works council elections. Declining 
CGT representativeness and limited strike turnout indicates insufficient associational power 
to successfully contest employer competitiveness demands. If unions adopting compromise 
and concession is where the electorate's support lies, it is difficult to see what place 
militancy will retain in the car plants except on the margins and catering only to a declining 
constituency. 
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However, one cannot conclude that the possibilities for contestation under competitiveness 
bargaining are entirely negligible. Adversarialism punctuated the negotiations in both PSA 
and Renault, and unions moderated employers by mobilising to encourage state 
intervention. Unions can still respond to employers’ competitiveness demands in a manner 
consistent with say Parson's (2013a) analytical emphasis and the country’s historical 
tradition: moving issues into the public arena to attract government and public support. This 
strategy partially worked to unions' advantage in Renault, where cross-union mobilisation 
pushed the employer to remove references to obligatory redeployment. Greater severity of 
the crisis at PSA limited this possibility, although it is also possible that Renault’s history as a 
nationalised company with a history of state interventionism may have made its unions more 
hopeful of government support than those at PSA, who have typically experienced a harsher 
managerial approach, as detailed in Section 4. In any case, oppositional strategies to attract 
state intervention may yield limited results in the long term, given government measures 
tend to be steered by employers’ organisations which consistently lobby for lower labour 
costs (Pernot, 2018: 39). 
 
Adversarialism in response to competitiveness bargaining is also partially sustained by the 
electoral-representative structure, but again only at the margins. Even those unions opting to 
support competitiveness agreements are alive to this potential electoral threat and must 
avoid being seen as too accommodating to employers’ demands to maintain credibility. This 
is evident by signatory unions’ tendencies to dedicate many of their public pronouncements 
to defending their position on competitiveness bargaining vis-à-vis the stance of non-
signatories and temporarily sidestepping unpalatable agreement commitments in electoral 
periods. Furthermore, with multiple unions evidencing a concessionary bias, there is little 
expectation or need for unions like the CGT to sign competitiveness agreements, facilitating 
their oppositionary approach. 
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In terms of our second research concerns on inter-union relations under competitiveness 
bargaining, the findings indicate that overcoming traditional divisions and rivalry proved 
elusive, despite the commonality in individual responses among the majority of unions. 
Competitiveness crises did not herald significant departures from traditional divisions. 
Unions remain locked into their inherited identities, and so the weight of history casts a 
shadow over the contemporary immediacies of competitiveness bargaining. Negotiations on 
competitiveness did appear to elicit some cooperation among unions, but is transient and 
confined to shared reviews on negotiation progress, with no sustained attempts to formulate 
joint negotiation positions. While unions' public pronouncements are rhetorically positive 
about the benefits of inter-union cooperation in addressing competitiveness pressures, 
individual unions' priorities trump coordination.  
 
The findings showed that inter-union differences are not merely a consequence of unions’ 
respective inherited legacies, although these remain important: the representativeness rules 
accentuate inter-union difference and unions' prioritisation of their individual institutional 
security, thereby weakening the capacity of unions to jointly respond to competitiveness 
challenges. While the representativeness rules do create conditions in which some 
elementary inter-union coordination becomes necessary, this occurs where individual unions 
are too representationally weak to act independently, or to side-line the CGT. This is 
opportunistically motivated by representative circumstance rather a broader political vision 
for a coordinated labour movement responding to the challenges of globalization. 
 
In summary, competitiveness bargaining, in the car industry at least, presents a situation 
where structurally weak unions, with fragmented and weak associational power, are locked 
into concessionary give-backs. However, those unions which are willing to ratify 
concessionary adjustments in competitiveness bargaining are also those which garner 
majoritarian support among the workforce. Within this pattern, occasional bouts of 
adversarialism persist, but on the margins and lacking major support. Unions remain unable 
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to overcome divisions in confronting competitiveness bargaining. This is in part because they 
retain allegiance to inherited organisational cultures, but also because of the electorally-
based system of trade union representativeness. At best, the representativeness system is 
insufficient to encourage sustained coordination among unions in responding to 
competitiveness bargaining, but, at worst, electorally-based representativeness is an 
institutional barrier to it. 
 
Finally, one might infer from this study more broadly some conclusions about the capacity of 
French unions to cope with globalisation via collective bargaining more generally. Collective 
bargaining works best where the two parties involved are approximately equal in strength or 
at least forced by circumstance to develop an ongoing relationship with each other. When 
one party has plausible options to exit and attractive options elsewhere, the relationship 
becomes unbalanced and the weaker, less mobile party must give up or revise expectations 
previously established in order to sustain the relationship and retain the attentions of the 
mobile partner. Unless enmeshed in a broader web of supportive political rules and 
economic structures that moderate inequalities between the parties and constrain the 
mobility of capital, then workplace collective bargaining under conditions of market 
liberalisation cannot offer unions sustainable respite from globalization (see also Silver, 
2003). Even on their own terms, the competitiveness agreements do not deliver on union 
objectives. The combination of wage restraint, significant headcount reductions and working 
time extensions in the PSA and Renault agreements facilitated a decline in unit labour costs 
in both firms throughout their duration9, seeing French automotive labour costs fall behind 
those of Germany, while gross value added per thousand employees (as one measure of 
productivity) rebounded (CCFA, 2018: 28; 30). Yet this has not helped to stabilize jobs in any 
sustainable fashion. Volume commitments are a poor measure of employment stabilization 
 
9	See	Statistica	(2017a)	‘Effectifs	totaux	du	groupe	PSA	Peugeot	Citroën	en	France	2013-2017’	
https://fr.statista.com/statistiques/603739/effectifs-totaux-psa-peugeot-citroen-france/;	Statistica	(2017b)	
Renault:effectifs	dans	le	monde	par	zone	géographique	2017’	
https://fr.statista.com/statistiques/549407/nombre-employes-groupe-francais-renault-par-zone/	
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as the industry continually upgrades its labour saving potential and fails to replace natural 
wastage. More broadly, there is much to commend Pernot (2018) observation that an 
effective union response to the challenges confronting France's political economy would be 
one that transcends the confines of atomised collective bargaining at firm level to embrace 
and sustain a broader political vision on a sustainable economic structure. However, as he 
observes nationally, and we observe at company and plant-level, there is little sign that the 
French labour movement can lead such a project given it remains trapped by inherited 
identities and divisions. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Case Characteristics 
 Plant  
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type/numbers 
employed 
Representative Unions at Company and Plant 
  CFDT CFE-CGC CFTC CGT FO GSEA SUD 
   
  Company 
PSA 5 Assembly/5 
Component/5 
R&D sites 
(France) 
State share 
ownership 
taken in 2015: 
13% 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
  Plant 
Mulhouse 
 
Assembly 
7,500 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
Poissy Assembly 
5,800 
employees 
   
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
Rennes Assembly 
4,000 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
Sevelnord Assembly 
2,400 
employees 
 
ü 
   
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
Sochaux Assembly 
9,600 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
Trémery Powertrain 
manufacture 
5,000 
employees 
 
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  Company 
Renault 5 assembly/5 
Component 
sites/2 R&D 
sites (France) 
State owned 
shares: 19% 
(increased 
from 15% in 
2015) 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  
  Plant 
Batilly Assembly 
2,300 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
   
ü 
Clēon Powertrain 
manufacture 
3,550 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
   
Douai Assembly 
3,800 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
Flins Assembly 
2,190 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  
Le Mans Powertrain 
manufacture 
2,380 
employees 
 
ü 
 
ü 
  
ü 
   
Sandouville Assembly 
1,770 
employees 
  
ü 
  
ü 
 
ü 
  
 
 
Table 2 Company-Level Union Representativeness% 
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*Plant-level representation figures available on request. 
 
 
 
 
  
 PSA 
 CFDT CFE-
CGC 
CFTC CGT FO GSEA SUD UNSA 
2007 11 16 14 26 16 17 x x 
2011* 14 18 12 22 18 14 1 1 
2015 15 20 12 19 19 12 1 2 
 Renault 
2005 17 25 4 31 21  2  
2007 19 27 4 29 20  2  
2011 19 30 3 25 16  7  
2015 21 32 2 24 13  7  
